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A Method for Proving Observational Equivalence
2009
2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing results focus on trace properties like secrecy (expressed as a reachability property) or authentication. There are however several security properties, which cannot be defined (or cannot be naturally defined) as trace properties and require the notion of observational equivalence. Typical examples are anonymity, privacy related properties or statements closer to security properties used in
doi:10.1109/csf.2009.9
dblp:conf/csfw/CortierD09
fatcat:kbq5ofom2najpg4keuqmoam3fq