Ownership Structure, Accounting Information Quality and Investment Efficiency: An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Agricultural Listed Companies

Fanyi Li
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 2nd International Conference on Modern Management, Education Technology, and Social Science (MMETSS 2017)   unpublished
The irrational investment in the development of agricultural listed companies leads to low investment efficiency and slow development. In order to explore the inefficient investment of agricultural listed companies, this paper uses China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock A 47 agricultural listed companies from 2013-2015 to analyze the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the inefficient investment of agricultural listed companies, and also the influence of ownership
more » ... of ownership structure on the quality of accounting information and the efficiency of agricultural listed companies. The study found that when the quality of enterprise accounting information is high, the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is improved, thus improving the efficiency of enterprise investment; the increase of controlling shareholder's equity will weaken the governance effect of accounting information quality on inefficient investment. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis The influence of the quality of accounting information on investment efficiency. High quality accounting information can alleviate the information asymmetry in capital market and reduce the distortion of resource allocation [1, 2] . The disclosure of accounting information in the capital market can reflect the operation of the enterprise more accurately, and enable the shareholders and creditors to have more information about the investment projects, it can effectively reduce adverse selection and liquidity risk, reduce financing costs, and reduce the investment shortage caused by financing constraints, so as to guide enterprises to invest rationally. The governance function of accounting information can reduce the inefficient investment caused by principal-agent problems. Accounting information alleviated agency conflicts between shareholders and management, and reduced agency costs, it is a kind of mechanism that can regulate
doi:10.2991/mmetss-17.2017.38 fatcat:pulanzb7m5dercch3upgeeawcq