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Which Is the Worst-Case Nash Equilibrium?
[chapter]
2003
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
A Nash equilibrium of a routing network represents a stable state of the network where no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate from its routing strategy. In this work, we investigate the structure of such equilibria within the context of a certain game that models selfish routing for a set of n users each shipping its traffic over a network consisting of m parallel links. In particular, we are interested in identifying the worst-case Nash equilibrium -the one that maximizes social
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45138-9_49
fatcat:now2k3qnmfazjodfrkmscgxz7i