Justification Of Inferences. Frege And Tractatus 5.132 [La Justificación De Las Inferencias. Frege Y El Tractatus 5.132]
Wittgenstein criticizes both Frege and Russel in Section 5.132 of the Tractatus for trying to justify the relation of logical implication with the help of fundamental laws of logic which would be external to propositions. Wittgenstein treats these relations between propositions, if they exist, as internal to them. Ian Proops concedes Wittgenstein's point as far as Russell is concerned, but is more cautious with respect to Frege. Parting from ideas I take from Brandom and Frápolli about semantic
... olli about semantic inferentialism and logical expressivism in Frege I want to show that it is not a belief in the conditional as primitive law of logic that for Frege justifies inferences and explains the relations between propositions, but that it is conceptual relations that permit making logical relations explicit in the form of material implication. I pretend to give a plausible argument that it is material inference in the sense of Sellars what is behind young Frege's reflections on logic but that is also fundamental for the Frege of Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic and that, in this respect, it would seem that Wittgenstein was wrong to include Frege in his critique of Russell.