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Britain's Electricity Capacity Auctions: Lessons from Colombia and New England
2014
Electricity Journal
The jury is still out on the need for government-organized capacity markets in order to achieve efficient long-run investments in electricity generation. When new capacity markets are introduced, however, it is important that they are well designed and take account of existing experience and previous design failures. Experience in both Colombia and New England provide a stark warning about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions at the center of electricity capacity markets. Among
doi:10.1016/j.tej.2014.05.004
fatcat:a5ohx3vxbbddtle35tl3aqv4fi