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IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Falcon is a very efficient and compact lattice-based signature finalist of the NIST's Post-Quantum standardization campaign. This work assesses Falcon's sidechannel resistance by analyzing two vulnerabilities, namely the pre-image computation and the trapdoor sampling. The first attack is an improvement of Karabulut and Aysu (DAC 2021). It overcomes several difficulties inherent to the structure of the stored key like the Fourier representation and directly recovers the key with a limiteddblp:journals/iacr/GuerreauMRR22 fatcat:dvyinpe4ungnnnrlqcmmbx5yu4