Asymmetric English Auctions

Vijay Krishna
2000 Social Science Research Network  
This paper studies equilibria of the n-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. Maskin (1992) showed that if the values satisfy a "single crossing" condition, then the two-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. In this paper two extensions of the single crossing condition, the "average crossing" condition and the "cyclical crossing" condition, are introduced. The main result is that under either
more » ... that under either of these conditions the n-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. * I am very grateful to Sergiu Hart, Motty Perry and Phil Reny for many helpful discussions. I also thank the participants at the Stony Brook Workshop on Auctions for their comments.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.244653 fatcat:lcigjz7zsfdaxccx375ssksjna