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Still Hammerable and Exploitable: on the Effectiveness of Software-only Physical Kernel Isolation
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
All the state-of-the-art rowhammer attacks can break the MMU-enforced inter-domain isolation because the physical memory owned by each domain is adjacent to each other. To mitigate these attacks, CATT [6], as the first generic and practical technique, physically separates each domain: it divides the physical memory into multiple partitions and keeps each partition occupied by only one domain. In this paper, we develop a novel exploit that could effectively defeat CATT and gain both root and
arXiv:1802.07060v3
fatcat:wmt72ighijckpllfic7bj3ncxe