Strategy-Proof Location of Public Facilities

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Marc Vorsatz
2015 Social Science Research Network  
Agents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is
more » ... e peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2690140 fatcat:czgzw4psdjbmtdequurbcgcezi