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The existence of a unique equilibrium is the classic tool for ensuring predictiveness of game theory. Typical uniqueness results, however, are for Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria and do not guarantee that natural game playing dynamic converges to this equilibrium. In fact, there are well known examples in which the equilibrium is unique, yet natural learning behavior does not converge to it. Motivated by this, we strive for stronger uniqueness results. We do not only require that there is adoi:10.1145/2600057.2602838 dblp:conf/sigecom/DuttingKT14 fatcat:5vv7xnfqxbcbjl6cbxirnlxbra