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Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
I study the consequences of heterogeneity of skills for the design of an optimal unemployment insurance, using a principal-agent set-up with a risk neutral insurer and infinitely lived risk averse agents. Agents are characterised by different productivities. They are employed by firms offering wages that depend both on the agents' individual productivity and the quality of the worker-firm-match. Agents face the risk of losing their job and, if unemployed, they are offered jobs with differentdoi:10.1628/093245608786534659 fatcat:nqox7kkdfjefrp22cwq2qg3rp4