New Approaches for Secure Distance- Bounding [article]

Ahmad Ahmadi Fatlaki, University Of Calgary, University Of Calgary, Reihaneh S. Safavi-Naini
2018
In this thesis we design and implement three aspects of secure distance-bounding (DB) schemes as a type of authentication scheme that considers distance as an extra verification parameter. By adding this new parameter to authentication schemes, we can prevent certain attacks that are related to distance, such as relay attack. In fact, the attacking scenarios can be much more complex than the simple relay attack, in addition to the classic authentication scheme attacks. In this thesis we
more » ... the most advanced distance-bounding attack scenarios in a variety of authentication models. We consider three authentication models in order to add the distance as an extra authentication factor: public-key and anonymous DB are the main fields of this thesis that consider strong adversary with access to directional antenna, and we consider One-Shot DB as a one-message authentication scheme. Each of these fields make a chapter of this thesis. Public-Key Distance-Bounding. In a public-key DB scheme, a prover who owns a key pair and is located within a distance bound to a verifier, who has access to the public-key of the prover, tries to convince the verifier that it is authentic and located within the distance bound. We provide a formal model and two protocols with security proofs. Anonymous Distance-Bounding. In an anonymous DB scheme, a prover who owns a registration certificate and is located within a distance bound to a verifier, who only has access to the public parameters of the system, tries to convince the verifier that it is authentic and located within the distance bound without revealing its identity. We provide a formal model and two secure protocols. One-Shot Distance-Bounding. In an one-shot DB scheme, a prover who owns a secret key and is located within a distance bound to a verifier, who has access to the corresponding key of the prover, tries to convince the verifier that it is authentic and located within the distance bound without receiving any message from the verifier. We provide a formal model and a se [...]
doi:10.11575/prism/31947 fatcat:pzi5zywha5bg5k7pggkhk6qrhe