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Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for species
2009
2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games
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The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is widely used to study the evolution of cooperation between selfinterested agents. Existing work asks how genes that code for cooperation arise and spread through a single-species population of IPD playing agents. In this paper, we focus on competition between different species of agents. Making this distinction allows us to separate and examine macroevolutionary phenomena. We illustrate with some specieslevel simulation experiments with agents that use
doi:10.1109/cig.2009.5286498
dblp:conf/cig/Hingston09a
fatcat:vwceadvpojeyznv5wmwjicxjfy