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Investigating Profiled Side-Channel Attacks Against the DES Key Schedule
2020
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Recent publications describe profiled single trace side-channel attacks (SCAs) against the DES key-schedule of a "commercially available security controller". They report a significant reduction of the average remaining entropy of cryptographic keys after the attack, with surprisingly large, key-dependent variations of attack results, and individual cases with remaining key entropies as low as a few bits. Unfortunately, they leave important questions unanswered: Are the reported wide
doi:10.13154/tches.v2020.i3.22-72
dblp:journals/tches/HeyszlMUSWGFDKK20
fatcat:hwkmysrf6rg4jdmy7l62pucrne