A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
UNIVERSITY COMPETITION, GRADING STANDARDS, AND GRADE INFLATION
2012
Economic Inquiry
We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize total wages of graduates. Job placement and wages hinge on a firm's productivity assessment given a student's university, grade and productivity signal. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between "good" and "bad"
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00491.x
fatcat:e4uzlfpam5ab3bwlwiniykg5cu