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The Randomized Communication Complexity of Randomized Auctions
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are randomized [Tha04,MV10,BCKW10,Pav11,HR15] (as well as by an open problem of Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Nisan [BGN17]),we focus on the randomized communication complexity of this problem (in contrast to most prior work on deterministic communication). We design
arXiv:2104.11275v1
fatcat:t5wkl3obpbhhzfsayritpkptcq