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Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders

2012
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Proceedings of the 44th symposium on Theory of Computing - STOC '12
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Prior-free auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders' valuations and provide worst-case (input-by-input) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good prior-free auctions with non-identical bidders. Prior-free auctions can approximate meaningful benchmarks for non-identical bidders only when "sufficient qualitative information" about the bidder asymmetry is publicly known. We consider digital goods auctions where there is a

doi:10.1145/2213977.2214018
dblp:conf/stoc/LeonardiR12
fatcat:fbu3mv5fvnbi7dbejfopmsk3ay