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Effects of Evolutionary Rules on Cooperative Tendencies in Franchising Networks
[chapter]
2014
Interfirm Networks
We develop a conceptual framework that integrates concepts from evolutionary (game) theory and from cultural anthropology to study how cooperation emerges and persists within organizational contexts. In particular, we argue the case for three rules that govern the evolution of cooperation -kinship selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. We apply these rules to a cooperative arrangement that displays particularly interesting features as regards its entrepreneurial members'
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10184-2_5
fatcat:pbqizpisfjgmfaii5nnxw4i7ny