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Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem

2014
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Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation - EC '14
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We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio

doi:10.1145/2600057.2602868
dblp:conf/sigecom/KrystaMRZ14
fatcat:v6adjaxjabfkxl5go6kjmfgpf4