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Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
[chapter]
2008
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We study strategic resource allocation settings, where jobs correspond to self-interested players who choose resources with the objective of minimizing their individual cost. Our framework departs from the existing game-theoretic models mainly in assuming conflicting congestion effects, but also in assuming an unlimited supply of resources. In our model, a job's cost is composed of both its resource's load (which increases with congestion) and its share in the resource's activation cost (which
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_19
fatcat:xtvmkumapnhcncy4lydl7cakki