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Taking total control of voting systems
2009
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing - SAC '09
The firmware of an electronic voting machine is typically treated as a "trusted" component of the system. Consequently, it is misconstrued to be vulnerable only to an insider attack by someone with an in-depth knowledge of the system and access to the source code. This case study focuses on the Diebold/Premier AccuVote Optical Scan voting terminal (AV-OS) that is widely used in the USA elections. We present three low level manipulations of the above voting terminal's firmware resulting in
doi:10.1145/1529282.1529736
dblp:conf/sac/DavtyanKKMNRSSS09
fatcat:whna6hg3nvcezhxv5jm3upt67y