CAPTCHA smuggling

Manuel Egele, Leyla Bilge, Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel
2010 Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing - SAC '10  
CAPTCHAs protect online resources and services from automated access. From an attacker's point of view, they are typically perceived as an annoyance that prevents the mass creation of accounts or the automated posting of messages. Hence, miscreants strive to effectively bypass these protection mechanisms, using techniques such as optical character recognition or machine learning. However, as CAPTCHA systems evolve, they become more resilient against automated analysis approaches. In this paper,
more » ... hes. In this paper, we introduce and evaluate an attack that we denote as CAPTCHA smuggling. To perform CAPTCHA smuggling, the attacker slips CAPTCHA challenges into the web browsing sessions of unsuspecting victims, misusing their ability to solve these challenges. A key point of our attack is that the CAPTCHAs are surreptitiously injected into interactions with benign web applications (such as web mail or social networking sites). As a result, they are perceived as a normal part of the application and raise no suspicion. Our evaluation, based on realistic user experiments, shows that CAPTCHA smuggling attacks are feasible in practice.
doi:10.1145/1774088.1774483 dblp:conf/sac/EgeleBKK10 fatcat:5qzt7ocwwjfwjpfgei3ebz6cca