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A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The "One Country - One Vote" Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank*
International economic journal
This paper analyses the "one country -one vote" rule for monetary policy decision making of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in a framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value is used as a solution concept. In contrast to former papers analysing the allocation of abstract "voting power" in comm ittees of international organisations, preferences for monetary policy are modelled to obtain a prediction about potential transfers implied by an equal allocation of votingdoi:10.1080/10168730100000007 fatcat:jc5uzstqhzhsdkv6fqmh4mggxm