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Democratization And Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
[book]
2005
Policy Research Working Papers
There is no consensus -but many competing theories -about the conditions under which political competition supports economic development in some countries but not in others. Theories range from the lack of political "institutionalization" to the lack of elite interest in the economic development of non-elites to voter information and polarization, and variations in electoral institutions. Keefer (2002) argues instead that political incentives to promote development depend on the ability of
doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3594
fatcat:ge46sy6kczbylevymxcwctdvbe