Symbolic Analysis of Terrorist Fraud Resistance [chapter]

Alexandre Debant, Stéphanie Delaune, Cyrille Wiedling
2019 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Distance-bounding protocols aim at preventing several kinds of attacks, amongst which terrorist fraud, where a far away malicious prover colludes with an attacker to authenticate once, without giving him any advantage for future authentication. In this paper, we consider a symbolic setting and propose a formal definition of terrorist fraud, as well as two reduction results. When looking for an attack, we can first restrict ourselves to consider a particular (and quite simple) topology.
more » ... under some mild hypotheses, the far away malicious prover has a best strategy on which we can focus on when looking for an attack. These two reduction results make possible the analysis of terrorist fraud resistance using an existing verification tool. As an application, we analyse several distance-bounding protocols, as well as some contactless payment protocols using the ProVerif tool.
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_19 fatcat:gdwrqir25nc3rkazjty532rmi4