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On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is, where agents have to be matched to other agents, has received much less attention. Moreover, two-sided matching literature has largely focused on ordinal preferences. This paper initiates the study of fairness in stable many-to-one matchings under cardinal
arXiv:2009.05823v4
fatcat:2qusae3g35a77oytty5aj2fawm