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The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements
2018
Informal Logic
In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep
doi:10.22329/il.v38i2.4966
fatcat:766bs4vl3bdztnk7lrezzpqjki