A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2015; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Truthful Auction Mechanisms with Performance Guarantee in Secondary Spectrum Markets
2015
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
We study a spectrum auction problem where each request from new spectrum users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. Our goal is to design truthful auction mechanisms that maximize either the overall social efficiency of new users (a.k.a buyers) or the revenue of the spectrum owner (a.k.a seller). Given that the optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation problem is NP-hard, this paper proposes a series of near-optimal auction mechanisms based on the following approximation techniques:
doi:10.1109/tmc.2014.2343976
fatcat:t72lzjs7jbghtcpamgzxhuklri