Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics
Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics
This section contains abstracts and complete bibliographic information for current working papers, listed alphabetically by primary author. Brief entries appear for secondary authors, cross-referenced to the primary author. For more recent as well as historical information, consult the AWPE DATABASE, available on magnetic media from Cambridge University Press. (Call 212-924-3900) Abell, Peter PG 150. PR no charge. JE J62.J63.J49. KW Self-Employment. Unemployment GDP. AB The paper reports upon a
... study of entry to and exit from self-employment in Great Britain between 1975 and 1991. Based upon Labour Force Survey data the effect on the unemployment rate upon entry and exit rates and the individual propensities to enter and exit self-employment are explored. Abrams, Richard K. PD March 1995. TI The Design and Printing of Bank Notes: Considerations When Introducing a New Currency. AA International Monetary Fund. SR International Monetary Fund Working Paper: 95/26; International Monetary Fund. 700 19th Street. Washington, DC 20431. PG 27. PR not available. JE E42, E58. KW Currency. Transitional Countries. AB Many newly independent or systemically transforming countries feel a pressing need to--or must-introduce their own national currency. Other countries simply wish to enhance the attractiveness, usefulness, durability, and/or security of their currencies. However, it is difficult to find consistent published information on the various aspects of this process. This paper attempts to ameliorate this problem by discussing the main issues in designing, producing, and printing a new currency, in order to help those charged with these tasks to proceed in an orderly and informed manner. Attention is also given to examining the options that may be available when this exercise must be undertaken on an emergency basis, with little or no warning. AB This paper shows that research in the labor market has important effects on accumulation decisions. In a labor market characterized by search, employment contracts are naturally incomplete and this creates a wedge between the rates of return and marginal products of both human and physical capital. As a result, when a worker invests more in his human capital, he increases the rate of return on physical capital. Provided that these factors are complements in the production function, this will increase the desired level of investment for firms. Then, because physical capital is not being paid its marginal product, the rate of return of all human capital goes up. Thus in this model there are pecuniary increasing returns to scale in human capital accumulation in the sense that the more human capital there is. the more profitable it is to accumulate human capital. Applying this argument conversely, the presence of pecuniary increasing returns in physical capital accumulation also follows. These pecuniary increasing returns lead to amplified inefficiencies and to the possibility of multiple equilibria. They also imply that factor distribution of income has an important effect on growth. Finally, the paper derives new links between unemployment and human capital accumulation and shows that when technology choice is endogenized, search introduces a negative wage formation externality which may lead to excessively fast diffusion of new technologies. PD May 1995. TI Corporate Control and Balance of Powers. . PR no charge. JE G32. KW Dispersion of Ownership. Managerial Discretion. AB Most managers enjoy considerable discretion and protection from possible interventions which enables them to look after their own interests. This is often attributed to the dispersion of shareholders and regulations that deter effective outside interventions. This paper presents a model that has empire-building managers who have important effort choices. Because the manager is not the residual claimant of the relevant returns, in order to provide him with the right incentives, he needs to be given sufficient discretion and the opportunity to share some of the rents he creates. To achieve this, equilibrium organizational form separates control from ownership and tries to contain the manager's empire-building incentives using performance contracts and the capital structure rather than more direct methods of control. Nevertheless, owners will often be unable to commit to managerial discretion because ownership of the assets gives them the right to decide to what use that asset will be put and thus the right to fire the manager. In this case, it will be necessary to choose a disperse ownership structure in order to create free-rider effects among shareholders and thus to commit them to be passive. Thus, the 399 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.