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In Arif Ahmed, editor, Newcomb's Problem, pages 115-137. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 0 Abstract The standard formulation of Newcomb's problem compares evidential and causal conceptions of expected utility, with those maximizing evidential expected utility tending to end up far richer. Thus, in a world in which agents face Newcomb problems, the evidential decision theorist might ask the causal decision theorist: "if you're so smart, why ain'cha rich?" Ultimately, however, the expecteddoi:10.1017/9781316847893.007 fatcat:x6kunwdzozb57k73cebqa2yepi