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We study a multi-unit auction with multiple agents, each of whom has a private valuation and budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense that, under standard assumptions, we prove that it is impossible to design a non-trivial truthful auction which allocates all items, while we provide the design of an asymptotically revenuemaximizing truthful mechanism which may allocate only some of the items. Our asymptotic parameter is a budget dominance parameterdoi:10.1145/1064009.1064014 dblp:conf/sigecom/BorgsCIMS05 fatcat:frnoebq4rfcyhpejh34gxdvhnq