Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi
2005 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '05  
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple agents, each of whom has a private valuation and budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense that, under standard assumptions, we prove that it is impossible to design a non-trivial truthful auction which allocates all items, while we provide the design of an asymptotically revenuemaximizing truthful mechanism which may allocate only some of the items. Our asymptotic parameter is a budget dominance parameter
more » ... measures the size of the budget of a single agent relative to the maximum revenue. We discuss the relevance of these results for the design of online ad auctions.
doi:10.1145/1064009.1064014 dblp:conf/sigecom/BorgsCIMS05 fatcat:frnoebq4rfcyhpejh34gxdvhnq