Does conceptual abstraction moderate if past moral deeds elicit moral consistency or licensing? A registered replication of Conway and Peetz (2012) [post]

Jareef Martuza, Olivia Kim
2022 unpublished
Although most would agree that we should strive to do good consistently, an open debate in sequential moral behavior is if doing one good deed elicits more good deeds (consistency) or liberates subsequent anti-social behavior (licensing). One attempt (Conway and Peetz, 2012; Study 1) at reconciling contradicting predictions posits conceptual abstraction moderates if past moral deeds elicit consistency or licensing. The authors found recalling moral behavior in the distant past leads to
more » ... cy, whereas recalling moral behavior in the recent past leads to licensing. Although cited 355 times, that study's small sample (N=101) and lack of neutral conditions reduce confidence in the conclusions. Increasing confidence regarding what can elicit consistent virtuosity and attenuate licensing has clear societal value. Therefore, we propose a registered replication and extension (N=3300) with neutral conditions with two main goals: (1) replicate original analyses in a high-powered setting, and (2) disentangle moral consistency, licensing, and compensation.
doi:10.31234/osf.io/4uvys fatcat:o6lp7y4omvawrhxcqmufkxzfbq