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Political Risk in Syndicated Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence Regarding the Use of Project Finance
2004
Social Science Research Network
We develop a double moral hazard model that predicts that the use of project finance increases with both the political risk of the country in which the project is located and the influence of the lender over this political risk exposure. In contrast, the use of project finance should decrease as the economic health and corporate governance provisions of the borrower's home country improve. When we test these predictions with a global sample of syndicated loans to borrowers in 139 countries, we
doi:10.2139/ssrn.567112
fatcat:zsrozdzy6famhi3xjchbfid4cq