No bits were destroyed in the making of this paper. This statement is a lie. This paper explores the nature of information by bringing together two questions posed by Luciano Floridi in his 'Open problems' paper [1]. Firstly: P.4: DGP, the data-grounding problem: How can data acquire their meaning? (and the later question Can PI [Philosophy of Information] explain how the mind conceptualises reality?) and P.11: The MIB (mind-information-body) problem: Can an informational approach solve the

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... body problem? In the first question, Floridi refers to work by Searle [2] and Mingers [3] . Interestingly, no reference is made to either author for the second question, considering that both have made relevant and interesting contributions to this question specifically. For Searle, there is no more a mind-body problem than any other dualism we choose to create semantically: it is a construct of concept, nothing more. For Mingers, a similar conclusion is reached by applying a phenomenological approach to Artificial Intelligence: that a disembodied intelligence is a contradiction. In both cases, the mind and body are one -it is not possible to escape acknowledging that thoughts arise from a physical (cognitive) process. This position has a resonance to Landauer's [4] view of information as an 'inevitably' physical entity; that at some point, all information is embodied. By this view, information remains a Shannonlike definition, a deterministic part of the embodied model where notions of semantic information are