Embodied Cognition and Information

Derek Jones
2015 Proceedings of ISIS Summit Vienna 2015—The Information Society at the Crossroads   unpublished
No bits were destroyed in the making of this paper. This statement is a lie. This paper explores the nature of information by bringing together two questions posed by Luciano Floridi in his 'Open problems' paper [1]. Firstly: P.4: DGP, the data-grounding problem: How can data acquire their meaning? (and the later question Can PI [Philosophy of Information] explain how the mind conceptualises reality?) and P.11: The MIB (mind-information-body) problem: Can an informational approach solve the
more » ... body problem? In the first question, Floridi refers to work by Searle [2] and Mingers [3] . Interestingly, no reference is made to either author for the second question, considering that both have made relevant and interesting contributions to this question specifically. For Searle, there is no more a mind-body problem than any other dualism we choose to create semantically: it is a construct of concept, nothing more. For Mingers, a similar conclusion is reached by applying a phenomenological approach to Artificial Intelligence: that a disembodied intelligence is a contradiction. In both cases, the mind and body are one -it is not possible to escape acknowledging that thoughts arise from a physical (cognitive) process. This position has a resonance to Landauer's [4] view of information as an 'inevitably' physical entity; that at some point, all information is embodied. By this view, information remains a Shannonlike definition, a deterministic part of the embodied model where notions of semantic information are
doi:10.3390/isis-summit-vienna-2015-s1004 fatcat:q3phpwnfenhmretsumq6sa72om