McEliece/Niederreiter PKC: Sensitivity to Fault Injection

Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Pierre Dusart
2010 2010 5th International Conference on Future Information Technology  
The McEliece and Niederreiter public key cryptosystems (PKC) are presumed secure in a post quantum world [4] because there is no efficient quantum algorithm that solves the hard problems upon which these cryptosystems are built. The present article indicates, however, a different type of vulnerability for such cryptosystems, namely fault injection. We present the injection fault in the McEliece scheme using Goppa codes and in two variants using quasi-cyclic alternant and quasi-dyadic codes, and
more » ... describe the main difference of those constructions in this context.
doi:10.1109/futuretech.2010.5482663 fatcat:ldkz42yj35elzdcn3vk42unohu