Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy

Richard Schmalensee
2009 Social Science Research Network  
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported Detailed Terms The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. ABSTRACT Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standardsetting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor
more » ... ot favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1219784 fatcat:vzzsguk2s5dqhhxvra57g4l5ii