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On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
2002
Social Choice and Welfare
Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, w j , to the alternative she ranks in j th position in her preference ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise
doi:10.1007/s355-002-8332-y
fatcat:5j4ydnweqng3tm7tgrtqgz6yzi