Vocational psychology has embraced the concept of an individual self as a core construct in semblances such as Parson's (1909) injunction to increase self-knowledge, Super's (1963) enjoinment to implement the self-concept, Betz and Hackett's (1981) encouragement to increase self-efficacy, and Cochran's (1997) edict to invest the self. Despite the centrality of self constructs in theory and practice, vocational psychologists have paid little attention to the linguistic explication of the self,

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... lying instead on its operational definition. This habitual inattention to examining the "self" is a serious oversight because it leaves vocational psychology's view of the self as fundamentally ambiguous. This does not mean that vocational psychology does not have a self; in fact, vocational psychology has multiple selves, at least three, with each one relatively distinct and existing in isolation from its other renderings. These different models of the self flow from different epistemologies, each of which shapes a distinct approach to science and practice. To elaborate career theories and advance counseling practice, vocational psychologists need at least to articulate their three main epistemic models of the self, and maybe someday organize the relationships among these models of the self into a nomological network. In this chapter, I seek to redress vocational psychology's inattention to the self and address the ambiguity of its meaning. To begin this work, I survey vocational psychology's three main views of human singularity. My surview of vocational psychology's three selves follows a chronological outline. During succeeding historical eras, different aspects of human singularity interested vocational psychologists so they developed a new set of terms and concepts to deal Self as Object, Subject, Project 3 with shifts in the meaning of individuality. Over time, vocational psychology developed what Kuhn (2000) referred to as language communities, each with its own paradigm for understanding the self and vocational behavior. Because the self is fundamentally ambiguous, adherents to each paradigm describe it with an agreed upon language and metaphors. Thus, each paradigm has a textual tradition or way of talking about the self. As we shall see, when they talk about individuals, differentialists use the language of personality, developmentalists use the language of personhood, and constructionists use the language of identity. Given its three paradigms and language communities, my thesis is that vocational psychology has at least three selves: the self as object, the self as subject, and the self as project. The three paradigms, or modes of understanding, differ from each other in their perspectives, presuppositions, and predominant metaphors. Nevertheless, each paradigm presents a reasonable and responsible way of organizing the world and conceptualizing the self. Each paradigm for understanding the self was conceptualized in a different historical era and gives pride of place to different aspects of human singularity. Thus, the products of this scholarly work gain clarity when viewed against their context, especially the dominant ideology of the age. The story of the self begins with the emergence of individualism as a central feature of modernity. The idea of an individual self emerged in industrial cities to replace the concept of character that had sustained moral order in agricultural societies. Character Since 1909, psychologists in Western societies have viewed the self as the major formative power in shaping vocational behavior. Scholars of the 19 th century took a different view. The self during the Victorian Age was not individual; it was part of a collective made of people acting as a group. Emerson (1886) in his 1844 essay on character went so far as to state 4 that "Character is this moral order seen through the medium of an individual" (p. 6) As part of a collective, people strove to develop a character that coordinated with the local boundedness, cosmic centeredness, and divine constitution of their community. To do so, each person was to strive to develop the very same characteristics. Many descriptions of good character exist, yet for purposes herein it can be described by six core characteristics: honesty, responsibility, respect, fairness, helpfulness, and thrift. Individuals were to learn the honesty required not to cheat, lie, or steal. They needed the responsibility of self-disciple to control their own behavior and to be accountable for its consequences. With regard to interpersonal relationships, good character included respect for other people as shown by polite manners, tolerance for individual differences, and participation in community affairs. Communities expected individuals to develop a sense of fairness to follow the rules and obey authority. If other people needed assistance, one should be helpful and share resources with them. And finally, each individual should display thrift in conserving their economic resources. The good character composed by these virtues of honesty, responsibility, respect, fairness, helpfulness, and citizenship showed itself in performance of duty--duty to self, duty to others, and duty to the state. Communities did not see vocational behavior as arising from an individual's outlook or personal agency. Instead, they believed that character was a response to society's agency. This belief is embedded in the word "character" which comes from the French "caractere," meaning a tool for engraving or sculpting. Communities stamped, impressed, and engraved character on its members by using prefigurations in the form of traditional plots, archetypal stories, theological parables, and cultural myths. This active and purposeful foreshadowing suggested by antecedent images what people should become. For example, myths imagine beforehand what a person should be like. Thus, a community's prefigured prototypes penetrated people's raw humanity to