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The Logic of Protecting Landscape Value Through Civil Law: A Game Theoretic Analysis
ゲーム理論で考察する景観の民事法的保護の論理
2012
Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan
ゲーム理論で考察する景観の民事法的保護の論理
The logic behind the Supreme Court's decisions to protect landscape value through civil law fails to contribute to the deterrence of landscape conflicts. This paper attempts to clarify whether it is possible to avoid landscape conflicts using the logical criterion of "local rule." A game theoretic solution reveals that landscape conflicts are avoidable under three conditions. Firstly, when the maintenance costs of a landscape is lower than its value for each individual person. Secondly, when
doi:10.11361/journalcpij.47.162
fatcat:4nkrxpt2fjftddqlg5wol3tbti