A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2022; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is
The Logic of Protecting Landscape Value Through Civil Law: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan
The logic behind the Supreme Court's decisions to protect landscape value through civil law fails to contribute to the deterrence of landscape conflicts. This paper attempts to clarify whether it is possible to avoid landscape conflicts using the logical criterion of "local rule." A game theoretic solution reveals that landscape conflicts are avoidable under three conditions. Firstly, when the maintenance costs of a landscape is lower than its value for each individual person. Secondly, whendoi:10.11361/journalcpij.47.162 fatcat:4nkrxpt2fjftddqlg5wol3tbti