The Logic of Protecting Landscape Value Through Civil Law: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Yuki Ebisu, Masahide Horita
2012 Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan  
The logic behind the Supreme Court's decisions to protect landscape value through civil law fails to contribute to the deterrence of landscape conflicts. This paper attempts to clarify whether it is possible to avoid landscape conflicts using the logical criterion of "local rule." A game theoretic solution reveals that landscape conflicts are avoidable under three conditions. Firstly, when the maintenance costs of a landscape is lower than its value for each individual person. Secondly, when
more » ... benefits of development are small and the probability of citizens winning lawsuits is high. Finally, the rate must be fixed at which citizens can practice local rule within a specific range. When the rate is set too high or too low, individuals have an incentive to free-ride.
doi:10.11361/journalcpij.47.162 fatcat:4nkrxpt2fjftddqlg5wol3tbti