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Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents
2018
ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information
This paper presents an analysis of the effects of cognitive agents employing selfish routing behavior in traffic networks with linear latency functions. Selfish routing occurs when each agent traveling on a network acts in a purely selfish manner, therefore the Braess Paradox is likely to occur. The Braess Paradox describes a situation where an additional edge with positive capacity is added to a given network, which leads to higher total system delay. By applying the concept of cognitive
doi:10.3390/ijgi7090345
fatcat:tffz2ipzqvbi7k36cvyknmppmu