Kant on Perception: Naïve Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction

Anil Gomes
2013 The Philosophical Quarterly  
Forthcoming, Philosophical Quarterly [accepted 2013] According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and ii) that this has
more » ... o bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
doi:10.1093/pq/pqt019 fatcat:caz3nici3rabbixe3x6kipbuui