Kant's (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism

Colin Marshall
2019 Kantian Review  
AbstractInterpreters of Kant's Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly
more » ... e implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction of Kant's Refutation that avoids the interpretative dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain.
doi:10.1017/s1369415418000535 fatcat:sbd2zv4x5bfsbmbkpa2mdzqc4a