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Repeated Matching Pennies with Limited Randomness
[article]
2011
arXiv
pre-print
We consider a repeated Matching Pennies game in which players have limited access to randomness. Playing the (unique) Nash equilibrium in this n-stage game requires n random bits. Can there be Nash equilibria that use less than n random coins? Our main results are as follows: We give a full characterization of approximate equilibria, showing that, for any e in [0, 1], the game has a e-Nash equilibrium if and only if both players have (1 - e)n random coins. When players are bound to run in
arXiv:1102.1096v2
fatcat:y7e4vr7icjbi3cajasnnc43jzy