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Best vs. All: Equity and Accuracy of Standardized Test Score Reporting
2022
2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
We study a game theoretic model of standardized testing for college admissions. Students are of two types; High and Low. There is a college that would like to admit the High type students. Students take a potentially costly standardized exam which provides a noisy signal of their type. The students come from two populations, which are identical in talent (i.e. the type distribution is the same), but differ in their access to resources: the higher resourced population can at their option take
doi:10.1145/3531146.3533121
fatcat:w3jc246u7rbmdgen6pmujxscqe