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The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
The American Economic Review
In an experiment, players' ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner's dilemma was substantially diminished when the payoffs were noisy, even though players could monitor one another's past actions perfectly. In contrast, in one-time play against a succession of opponents, noisy payoffs increased cooperation, by slowing the rate at which cooperation decays. These observations are consistent with the robust observation from the psychology literature that partial reinforcementdoi:10.1257/aer.96.4.1029 fatcat:2r2g6fqswvdxtf3b4gutezgk4i