An economic analysis of debarment

Emmanuelle Auriol, Tina Søreide
2017 International Review of Law and Economics  
With a view to reducing the consequences of corruption in public procurement, many governments have introduced debarment of suppliers found guilty of corruption and some other forms of crime. This paper explores the market effects of debarment on public procurement. Debarment is found to make little difference in markets with high competition, while in markets with low competition it may deter corruption as long as firms value public procurement contracts in the future and there is a certain
more » ... k of being detected in corruption. On the other hand, debarment -when it works -has an anti-competitive effect, and this contributes to facilitate collusion between suppliers. If designed with an understanding of the market mechanisms at play, debarment can deter both collusion and corruption, thus improving the results of public procurement. If so, most current debarment regimes need modification. JEL Classification: K21, K23, K42, L41, H57
doi:10.1016/j.irle.2017.04.004 fatcat:vlplzolhvjhepi4ywme53q67l4