Principii di Criminologia. Vol. II. Part Generale (Circostanze Discriminanti, scusanti ed aggravanti) [Principles of Criminology. Vol. II. General Part (Justifying, Excusing and Aggravating Circumstances)]
[review-book]
Robert Ferrari
1920
Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology
Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid--seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non--commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal
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... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 310 REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS 310 REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS of seeing in instinct nothing but the functioning of a set of inherited neuro-muscular reflexes. He recognizes the fact that the individual is endowed at birth with a set of psychophysical tendencies (the author would probably prefer to say "reaction systems") which develop in partial independence of subsequent experience. To these he reserves the name instincts. He also recognizes that these instincts constitute an integral and important part of all, or nearly all, human behavior which is in that sense instinctive behavior. The only form of human behavior which is not instinctive is rational behavior, which arises in the course of instinctive behavior and is "always initiated by reflective consideration of ways and means." The thought of the article is developed largely through the critique of other authors, principally Stout, McDougall, Thorndike and Drever. The presentation is somewhat abstract and presupposes acquaintance with the author's conception of "conscious behavior." It will repay the careful study of every student of psychology. We should have more books of this sort on criminology. It gives us Americans just what we need. It is a philosophic discussion of the bases of law-a discussion which, because we call it philosophic, is none the less vital to the proper comprehension of the law and to the adequate treatment of the criminal. The translations of European treatises which have within the last decade appeared in this country have already produced advantageous marks upon our scholarship, upon our law, and upon the attitude of teachers, students, lawyers and judges. The work is an application of psychology, psychiatry, biology and sociology to law. The law cannot progress unless it keep informed of the progress in other sciences. The law must of necessity be based upon other sciences; and for law to close its eyes to the advances in those sciences is to miss the path that leads to truth and justice. Anglo-American law has moved on in conformity with changes in life in England and in this country; but the movement has been slow, and has not kept pace with the changes in life. Anthropology, psychology, biology, psychiatry, economics, sociology, criminology, philosophy have all contributed elements for the enlightenment of law, but law has been a willful soul and has obstinately refused to listen to the promptings of those sciences upon which it must rest. There is ample of seeing in instinct nothing but the functioning of a set of inherited neuro-muscular reflexes. He recognizes the fact that the individual is endowed at birth with a set of psychophysical tendencies (the author would probably prefer to say "reaction systems") which develop in partial independence of subsequent experience. To these he reserves the name instincts. He also recognizes that these instincts constitute an integral and important part of all, or nearly all, human behavior which is in that sense instinctive behavior. The only form of human behavior which is not instinctive is rational behavior, which arises in the course of instinctive behavior and is "always initiated by reflective consideration of ways and means." The thought of the article is developed largely through the critique of other authors, principally Stout, McDougall, Thorndike and Drever. The presentation is somewhat abstract and presupposes acquaintance with the author's conception of "conscious behavior." It will repay the careful study of every student of psychology.
doi:10.2307/1133921
fatcat:v7ja4f2kmrd43p27zflpm5oyry