A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is
Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization
Stasavage 1 This paper proposes a revision to existing arguments that institutions of limited government (characterized by multiple veto points) improve the ability of governments to credibly commit. Focusing on the issue of sovereign indebtedness, I present a simple framework for analyzing credibility problems in an economy divided between owners of land and owners of capital. I then argue that establishing multiple veto points can improve credibility, but whether this takes place depends upondoi:10.1093/jleo/18.1.155 fatcat:wveyutnhgfhhvfgkfcl4axo3mq