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In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane's attempt at facing Nes' criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes' counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms thatdoi:10.30687/jolma//2020/01/002 fatcat:45sfc3sjnjddbbqr2iglkhkscy