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Reconstructing an S-box from its Difference Distribution Table
2019
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
In this paper we study the problem of recovering a secret S-box from its difference distribution table (DDT). While being an interesting theoretical problem on its own, the ability to recover the S-box from the DDT of a secret S-box can be used in cryptanalytic attacks where the attacker can obtain the DDT (e.g., in Bar-On et al.'s attack on GOST), in supporting theoretical analysis of the properties of difference distribution tables (e.g., in Boura et al.'s work), or in some analysis of
doi:10.13154/tosc.v2019.i2.193-217
dblp:journals/tosc/DunkelmanH19
fatcat:tq5hjkjubfe73k4hbskcevqpie